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Editors' Note: The following article by 
Professor Scriven and a reply by Professor 
Susan Fiosen (unavailable at present) were 
presented at the Pacific Divison meeting of 
the Society for the Study of Ethics and 
Animals, held in Portland, Oregon, 
March 26, 1992, 
Tbe clash between environmentalists and animal 
liberationists was summarized a few years ago by the 
title of Mark Sagoff's article "Animal Liberation and 
Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce."] 
The problem, of course, is not environmental ethics per 
se but a certain kind of environmental ethics, namely, 
what has come to he called "deep ecology" (as well as 
"biocentrism," "ecocentrism" and "the land ethic"). !'or 
the deep ecologist, environmental issues must be looked 
at from a fully holistic perspective, that is, from the 
point of view of the whole biosphere. At Hrst, this would 
seem to be a natural extension of our basic moral 
sentiments. Having established the moral considera­
bility of all humans and then all mammals and then all 
living individuals, the next logical step would seem to 
be an extension of our moral concern to the biosphere 
as a whole. 
But, as was soon recognized, the holism of deep 
ecology cuts directly against any strong concern for the 
pain and suffering of individual animals; from the 
biocentric point of view, the concern of animal 
liberationists for the welfare of individual animals, is 
"biologically preposterous," to use 1. Baird Callicott's 
term.2 The integrity of the biosphere is underpinned 
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largely by a cycle of eating and being eaten which 
cannot and should not be interfered with because of a 
passing squeamishness in a few humans. Are we, after 
all, to intervene on behalf of a rodent to insure that its 
rights are not violated by any condors? 
This appeal to the necessity of predation in the 
natural order of things is, of course, familiar rhetorical 
territory for animal liberationists. They are quite used 
to hearing about the hunter instinct from people who 
do all of their hunting at Safeway (as though something 
of great ecological import hinges upon the production 
of cube steak and little styrofoam trays), Rhetoric 
aside, the central misgivings of animal liberationists 
were given voice several years ago by Tom Regan.3 
In the Hrst place, the holism of the deep ecologists 
threatens us with a kind of "environmental fascism" 
which would require the merciless extermination of 
animals and, particularly, humans for the good of the 
greater biotic whole. Secondly, it is utterly unclear how 
anything below the conativc level of animals can be 
sensibly argued to have any interests and, thus. any 
good of its own. The attribution of sentience to plants 
and rocks (let alone whole ecosystems) seems to be 
something best left to the editors of the National 
Enquirer, and if such things can't have beliefs, desires 
and feelings, then how can they have any good apart 
from that attributed to them by sentients? In other 
words, there is an immediate problem with any claim 
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that we ought to adopt some biotic perspective 
inasmuch as the biosphere docs not appear to be the 
kind of thing that can have a perspective. 
What was not recognized by Regan was that these 
two lines of criticism are antithetical. If the biosphere 
cannot have a good of its own, then nothing could be 
sacrificed for that good. For the sake of clarity, animal 
liberationists must make up their minds about how they 
ought to face off against the ecocentrists. It is the point 
of this paper to argue that they (and everyone else) ought 
to reject the idea that nature as a whole has any interests 
or good unto itself. Tshall survey many of the arguments 
that have been used to establish ecocentric positions 
and argue that they all lead to an ecology which is 
Llnfathomahly deep. 
As a first approach to the issue of what can and 
cannot have interests, let us consider the arguments of 
R. G. Frey and Paul Taylor. Neither of these writers is a 
full-blown hoJist (although Taylor is close). ror both, 
the immediate concern is the attribution of intrinsic 
value to individual nonsentients (although Frey is 
interested in such an attribution only for the sake of 
showing that it doesn't amount to much). Nevertheless, 
it would seem as though the question about nonconative 
individuals will stand or fall with the one about 
nonconative wholes. Whether we are talking about 
individual trees, whole forests or whole planets, the 
basic mystery is how anything can have a good of its 
own without being the subject of some kind of desire 
or end in view. 
Frey's argument is that, although nonconative things 
may not be able to have an interest in anything, there 
may still be things which arc in their interests. Although 
trees and tractors may not have an interest in. 
respectively, maximal growth or proper maintenancc, 
these things may really be in thc interests of trees and 
tractors.4 Similarly, Taylor argues that, "we can act in a 
being's interest or contrary to its interest without its 
being interested in what we are doing to it in the sense 
of wanting or not wanting us to do it."s This line of 
argument is profoundly unsatisfactory. Who are we to 
say what the interest of a tree is? In the case of the 
lrclctor, we wiJI generally assume that it is supposed to 
perform certain functions for which it was expressly 
designed. And even here there are problems, for I might 
buy a tractor for tIle usual reasons or I might buy one 
specifically to let it rust and sit in my yard as a sculptural 
statement about something. If I wanted it as sculpture 
!lIen Twould not be surprised if someone suggested iliat 
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I was not doing with the tractor what was supposed to 
be done with it, because this only implies that I would 
not be doing wiili it what is usually done with tractors. 
But I would be quite surprised if someone claimed that 
I was not acting in the best interests Of the tractor. I 
would understand someone saying that I was wasting a 
piece ofmachinery that other humans might make better 
use of, but what difference could any of this possibly 
make in terms of what is good for the tractor? 
However, in ilie case of trees, things are even worse. 
Both Frey and Taylor argue that it is clearly not in the 
interest of a tree to bul1doze it down, perhaps, for later 
conversion into a coffee table; its interest is in 
"flourishing." But here, an obvious pieee of question­
begging is at work. What it means to flourish is, roughly, 
La develop in the right way, and what is at stake here is 
the issue of whether or not it is right for us to develop 
the trce into a coffee table or into mulch. When called 
upon for a foundation for the claim that the right way 
for a tree to devclop is to "flourish" (i.e., to have lots of 
leaves and seeds at certain times, reach a maximal 
height or width, whatever) Taylor gives us the 
fol1owing claim: "We can think of the good of an 
individual nonhuman organism as consisting in the 
full development of its biological powers.''6 But the 
"biological power" of any tree is for it, ultimately, to 
become mulch or ashes. Moreover, if we are to avoid 
the "arrogance" of thinking of ourselves as being outside 
of nature, ilien the fact thatmany trees wind up as coffee 
t.ables means that the "biological power" of many trees 
is to become coffee tables. 
Things are not improved one bit by going deeper 
into the history of philosophy to find a foundation for 
an environmental ethic. Robin Attfield, for example, 
eventually fesses up to an underlying "Aristotelian 
principle" beneath the attribution of interests to non­
sentient beings. Pol1owing Clark,7 Attfield pegs tlle neo­
Aristotelian telos of a thing a<; "the proper fulfillment 
of fits1genetically programmed potentialities."g What 
is "neo" about this nco-Aristotelianism is not just the 
mention of genetic programming but, more importantly, 
the fact that tele are attributed to nonsentients on the 
basis of ilieir own ends whereas Aristotle held that the 
good of plants had to be understood in terms of the 
good of animals which, in tum, had to be understood in 
terms of the good of humans. By reducing all 
teleological concerns to humans, Aristotle avoids the 
obvioLlS problem wiili Attfield's position, namely, that, 
in chcx1sing among ilie ends that befall trees, we are 
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being profoundly presumptuous in claiming to know 
that the "proper" end of a tree is to have a maximal height 
or width rather than to be mulch, ashes or a coffee table; 
nature dictates no one of these ends over the others. 
Things only get worse when we abandon the 
individualistic approaches of Frey, Attfield and Taylor9 
and move toward the holism of Callicott, Leopold, 
Rodman, Stone and others. Here, the problem of 
arrogant presumption is simply moved to a different 
level. Rather than claiming that they know what is good 
for a tree, they go on to claim knowledge of what is 
good for the whole of the planet-cven absent any 
indications from the planet itself. The move from 
individualism to holism, of course, does nothing but 
compound the arrogance of those who claim to know 
what's good for individual trees, carrots or rocks. To 
make a long argument very short, I submit that if we 
humans were to explode fifty thousand nuclear devices 
on the face of this planet tomorrow, there would be no 
tolerably clear sense in which we have "hurt nature" 
(beyond that hurt felt by sentients on this planet). 
Eventually, some organisms would survive and even 
thrive in the new order of things, and others would 
perish-such is life. Indeed, biological diversity would 
not likely be as great, because the most likely victims 
of the radiation would be mammals, birds and other 
predators who playa central role in diversification of 
species. Indeed, the "beauty of the biotic community" 
may suffer, but that will be because there will not likely 
be any creatures around who have any sense of beauty.10 
The use of the word "arrogance" in the last few 
paragraphs will not be seen as gratuitous by anyone 
who has looked at the literature on environmental ethics. 
Generally, what deep ecologists have seen as the 
principle cause of our current environmental problems 
is an arrogance about our relationship to nature that 
comes out of not only the Judea-Christian tradition but 
also the Greco-Roman tradition and the European 
Enlightenment. l1 The way to combat such arrogance, 
it seems to me, is to realize our profound ignorance 
about how nature works and, accordingly, to adopt an 
extreme conservatism in our dealings with a biological 
leviathan that has the capability of retaliating with a 
vengeance when we make apparently minor but 
irreparable alterations in the biosphere. The course of 
the deep ecologists seems, paradoxically enough, to 
base environmental concern on an assumption that we 
not only know Iww nature works but, also, how it oUj?ht 
to work. They explicitly go beyond what's good for us 
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to claims about what's good for it, as though they, like 
the Christians, know why nature is here. Moreover, there 
is another level to my uneasiness about tlleir general 
line of argument caused by the constant intrusion of 
neo-Aristotelianism and, more pertinently, neo­
Thomism into their writings. As Passmore points out, 
the Judeo-Christian tradition does not unequivocally 
lead to the position that the earth is here to do with as 
we please. The earth is here as a consequence of God's 
benevolent and omniscient design and creation. If, then, 
nature is of God's design, we should not seek to alter 
the natural course of things. This, of course, is not fully 
(if at all) compatible with much of Genesis, but it does 
allow the Judea-Christian to hold the general ideology 
that we should think of ourselves as stewards of the 
eartll rather than as despots over it. 
What is especially troublesome with this idea that 
to alter the natural course of ulings (where "natural" 
usually is taken to mean "wiUlOut human intervention") 
is sacrilegious is, of course, that it is behind a pemicious 
traditionalism which ha<; held, among other things, that 
slavery is right because hlacks are "naturally" suited to 
heavy lahor, that ahortion is wrong hecallse it interrupts 
the "natural" course of the pregnancy, that euthanasia 
is wrong because it alters the "natural" time of death, 
iliat homosexuality is wrong because it is "unnatural" 
in the sense that it constitutes "the use of an organ for 
something other ilian it's intended purpose," and that 
airplanes are the work of the devil because humans don't 
"naturally" have wings. The deep ecologists have 
dispensed with the intent of God to figure out what the 
"natural course" of things is only to submit their own 
assurances that they know what it is. 
Nothing in this debate is advanced by Callicott's 
talk of "bio-empathy," which he derives from what he 
argues to be a Humean moral subjectivism. He argues 
Ulat the crucial insight ofHwne is that allmistic impulses 
form as hasic a part of Ollf overall set of moral 
sentiments as do egoistic ones. These altruistic impulses, 
however, are extremely variable, given the influence 
of reasonable deduction, acculturation and increased 
scientific understanding. So, on iliis view, why can't 
our altruistic sentiments be extended to natural objects 
and even to whole ecosystcms? The rcason we can't do 
this is because altruistic empathy for another is 
impossible unless you know what that other entity feels, 
wants or has an interest in. I can certainly undersl<wd 
how I and other mammals have an interest in the 
environment not becoming inhospitable to mammalian 
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life but I can't see at all that tlte environment has any 
stake in this matter~it will go on regardless ofour fate. 
Moreover, nothing is advanced by the tum toward 
very deep ecology reflected in the writings of people 
like Rolston, the Roulleys and Shepard. This tum is 
given a sympathetic rendition by Callicott, who cites 
Alan Watts's claim that "the world is your body," 
Shepard's claim that "the skin is ecologically like a pond 
surface or a forest soil, not a shell so much as delicate 
interpenetration," Rolston's claim that "neither lake nor 
self has independent being... .Inlet waters have crossed 
this interface and are now embodied within me," and 
Capra's claim that "quantum theory ...reveals a basic 
oneness in the universe ....The Cartesian partition 
between the I and the world...cannot be made.... "12 
Use might well be made in these musings of ParfH's 
work on personal identity. At any rate, the basic problem 
remains the same: I might well feel one with the world, 
but what does this part of me want? What would be 
goodfor it? To tell me that I am it is to simply leave me 
confused about what I feel about myself and, thus, to 
leave me confused about why I should care abollt 
anything. 13 This sort of ecology is not merely deep; it 
is unfathomahle. 
Notes 
1 Mark Sagoff, "Animal Liberatiun and Envirunmental 
Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce." QQ: Reportfrom the 
Center for Philosophy and Public Policy 4 (Spring (984). 
2J. Baird Callicott. In Defense ofthe Land Ethic (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1989). p. 32. 
1 Tom Regan. The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 1983). See especially pp. 
360-363. 
4 See his "Rights. Interests, Desires and Beliefs." American 
Philosophical Quarterly 16 (July 1979), pp. 233-39 
5 Paul W. Taylor, 'The Ethics of Respect for Nature." 
Environmental Ethics 3 (Fall 1981), p. 199 
b Ibid. 
7 Stephen Clark, The Moral 5;latlls ofAnimals (Oxford: 
Clarendun Press. 1977). 
8 Robin Attfield, "The Good of Trees." The Journal of 
Value Inquil)' 15 (1981). p. 43. Emphasis added. 
9 It must be noted that Frey and Attfield don't put much 
weight on the interests of nonsentients, and Taylor leans 
heavily in the direction of holism. 
Winter 1993 19 
10 That the beauty of nature is something that appears to 
presuppose a human aesthetic sense is recognized by lohn 
Rodman as a problem with Aldo Leopold's dictum that right 
is a matter of the preservation of the" integrity. stability and 
beauty of the biotic community." Rodman thinks that the tenn 
"beauty" ought to be replaced by something like "diversity." 
See Leopold's Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1949) and Rodman's "Ecological 
Sensibility" (In VanDeVeer and Pierce, People, Penguins and 
Plastic Trees. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing, 1986). 
11 The historian Lynn White once argued that the 
responsibility for OIlI current environmental insensitivity grew 
entirely out of Christian attitudes. As John Passmore has 
pointed out, onr condescension to nature has its roots in the 
pre-Christian attitudes of the Greeks and Romans, and, 
moreover. ludea-Christian thonght has not been completely 
antithetical to an attitude of respect for natllIe. See Passmore's 
Man sResponsibilityfor Nature (London: Duckworth. 1980), 
Part One. 
12 See Callicott's In Defense of the Land Ethic pp. 112, 
113 and 171. 
13 There is another problem with this very deep ecology 
(or. at least, with Callicott's sympathy for the position) 
inasmuch as his "biD-empathy" is based on an extension of onr 
natural altruism, not a mere extension ofour egoism as would 
result from a serious belief that the world really is my body. 
Between the Species 
